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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with federal law on a question which should be settled 
by the Supreme Court insofar as the appellate court granted 
plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1988 even though: 
(a) Plaintiff's constitutional claim was denied 
by the trial court, thus preventing plaintiff from 
being recognized as a "prevailing party" for purposes 
of 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1988; and 
(b) The substantive state law claim on which 
plaintiff prevailed did not arise from the same opera-
tive facts as plaintiff's constitutional claim. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly decided an 
important question of state law which has not previously been 
addressed by this Court when it ruled that a school district can-
not grant partial fee waivers to families who are ineligible for 
a full waiver. 
DECISIONS IN THIS CASE 
The Opinion of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 
1989, and reversing the trial court was reported at 124 Utah Adv. 
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Rep. 37 (Ct. App. 1989). Different results were reached on 
rehearing as reported at 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The trial court Judgment and Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and the Opinion and Amended Opinion of the Court 
of Appeals are reproduced in Addendum "A." 
JURISDICTION 
A. The Amended Opinion of the Court of Appeals was 
entered March 6, 1990. 
B. The Amended Opinion was rendered upon Lorenc's 
Petition for Rehearing. There has been no subsequent Petition 
for Rehearing. 
C. This Court has jurisdiction to grant review by writ 
of certiorari on all of the questions presented for review pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(5). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES 
AND REGULATIONS 
FEE WAIVERS, 
Utah Code Ann. provides in relevant part: 
A local board of education shall require . . . that 
adequate waivers or other provisions are available to 
insure that no student is denied the opportunity to 
participate because of an inability to pay the required 
feef deposit or charge. 
Utah Code Ann. S 53-7(a)(2) (Supp. 1987). 
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The State Board of Education fee waiver policy similarly 
provides: 
A board of education shall provide, as part of any fee 
policy or schedule, for adequate waivers or other pro-
visions to insure that no student is denied the oppor-
tunity to participate in a class or school sponsored or 
supported activity because of an inability to pay the 
fee. 
The waiver policy shall include procedures to 
insure that: 
(d) Fee waivers or other provisions in lieu of fee 
waivers are available to all students who are in state 
custody or receiving public assistance in the form of 
aid to dependent children, general relief, supplemental 
security income, or foster care, and others whose par-
ents or guardians are financially unable to pay. 
Admin. Code R. 300-407-6(A)(4) (1987-88).-7 
Granite School District Administrative Memorandum No. 
2/ 24, July 29, 1986- established the following Granite fee waiver 
policy in effect during the 1986 to 1987 school year: 
Fees, as identified by the Granite School District 
Board of Education, will be waived in accord with Utah 
State Board of Education standards for students whose 
parents or legal guardians are the recipient of public 
assistance in the form of Aid to Dependent Children, 
i/ This provision was adopted by the State Board of Education 
June 3, 1986 and was in effect during the period relevant to 
this action. 
2/ Though not pertinent to this proceeding, Administrative Mem-
orandum No. 24 was amended September 19, 1989, to make fee 
waivers available for all students financially unable to 
pay. 
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General Relief, Supplemental Security Income, Foster 
Care, or other benefits provided through the Department 
of Social Services due to a limited financial ability 
within the family. (The receipt of unemployment com-
pensation and/or free or reduced price school lunches 
does not constitute public assistance as above 
defined). 
A student desiring fee waivers will present to the 
principal of the school a written communication pro-
vided by the Utah Department of Social Services or the 
Social Security Office in the case of "Supplemental 
Security Income" verifying the need for the waiver. 
Upon receipt of such verification, the principal will 
waive requested fees for the student. In the event 
that the student bringing forward the verification 
desires an accommodation other than fee waiver, the 
principal, with the permission of the parent or legal 
guardian, may provide an alternative to the payment of 
the fee or the waiver. Such may include a deferred 
payment schedule, a reduced payment schedule, or a pro-
vision for a work/service program . . . 
Parents whose students have been denied a fee waiver 
may appeal to the Granite School District. Office of 
Pupil Services for review. In the event that Pupil 
Services feels a waiver is warranted, the principal and 
a Pupil Services designee will meet with the Area 
Assistant Superintendent who will make a determination 
in the matter. 
That same memorandum also provides in a summary provision: 
Students must be able to enroll and participate in any 
class, and have the opportunity to acquire all skills 
and knowledge required for full credit and highest 
grades, without paying a fee. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 
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Utah Const, art. I, S 7: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const, amend XIV, S 1. 
FEE PROVISIONS OF UNITED STATES CODE. 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress. . . . 
42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (1981). 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 
sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1981 of the 
Revised Statutes [20 U.S.C.S SS 1981-1983, 1985, 1986], 
title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.S SS 1681 et 
seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reason-
able attorney's fee as part of the costs. 
42 U.S.C.A. S 1988 (1981). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Gwen Lorenc ("Lorenc"), plaintiff and appellant, initi-
ated this action against the Granite School District ("Granite") 
February 11, 1987. (R. 8). She claimed that Granite's school 
fee waiver policy (the "Granite Policy") violated Utah statute 
because it was more restrictive than the Utah State Board of Edu-
cation School Fees Policy ("State Policy"). (R. 5-6). The basis 
for her contention was that the State Policy included a provision 
that "waivers or other provisions in lieu of fee waivers are 
available . . . [to students whose families receive public assis-
tance] and others whose parents or guardians are financially 
unable to pay." (Emphasis added). (R. 2). The wording of the 
Granite Policy, although otherwise similar to the State Policy, 
did not specifically include the language "parents or guardians 
who are financially unable to pay." (R. 3). 
In addition to Lorenc's claim that the Granite Policy 
was invalid on its face, she claimed that Granite's application 
of its waiver policy violated the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the United States constitution. (R. 5-6). Those 
contentions were based on her allegations that she had been 
denied both an appeal hearing and a fee waiver even though alleg-
edly eligible for a waiver under the State Policy. (R. 5-6). 
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Lorenc prayed for a declaration that Granite's fee 
waiver policy was invalid and an order requiring Granite to con-
duct an appeal hearing and waive all school fees charged to her. 
(R. 8) She also moved for preliminary and permanent injunctions 
enjoining Granite's continued use of its fee waiver policy until 
adoption of a new policy in compliance with the State Policy and 
Utah statute. (R. 8). 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW, 
Lorenc's motion for preliminary and permanent injunc-
tions was heard and denied. (R. 75). After trial before the 
district court, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
adopted and Lorenc's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. (R. 
96-104). 
On appeal, the court ruled: (a) That the Granite Policy 
was invalid because it was more restrictive on its face than the 
State Policy; (b) That granting partial fee waivers was contrary 
to the State Policy; and (c) That Lorenc's attorney's fees claim 
based on 42 U.S.C. S 1988 was denied. Lorenc v. Call, 124 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 37, 5-7 (Ct. App. 1989), different results reached on 
rehearing, Lorenc v. Call, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 
3/ 1990).- The appellate court did not address Lorenc's due 
See Addendum A. 
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process claim or any of the facts supporting that claim. Lorenc, 
124 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. Neither did the appellate court address 
whether she would have been eligible for a full waiver under the 
State Policy. 
On Lorenc's Petition for Rehearing, the Court of 
Appeals restated its previous ruling on the merits of the case, 
but reversed its prior denial of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. S 1988 in a split decision on that issue. Lorenc, 129 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 6, 7, 10. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON REVIEW, 
1. Lorenc applied for a fee waiver for her daughter, a 
senior at Granite High School and the oldest of six children, on 
September 5, 1986. (R. 29). 
2. Lorenc's application for a full waiver was denied. 
(R. 209 at 17, 79, 122). On September 22, 1986, Lorenc requested 
a hearing on her waiver application. (R. 209 at 18 and Exhibit 9 
thereto). Her application was heard on November 5, 1986, at 
which time she was allowed to present all desired information and 
evidence of financial need. (R. 209 at 121, 125). Lorenc was 
then offered a partial waiver and opportunity to pay the remain-
ing fees through a work credit. (R. 209 at 121-22). 
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3. Lorenc's appeal of Granite's November 5, 1986 deci-
sion was heard March 9, 1987, and denied. (R. 209 at 126, 
128-129). 
4. Lorenc's counsel cancelled two appeal hearings 
which Granite had scheduled prior to March 9, 1987. (R. 209 at 
126). 
5. Lorenc was represented by counsel at the March 19, 
1987 hearing and was given an opportunity to present evidence, 
cross-examine school district witnesses, and call her own wit-
nesses. A written decision was rendered. (R. 209 at 127-129). 
6. This action was filed by complaint dated February 
11, 1987 claiming both that Granite Policy was invalid under 
State law and also that her constitutional rights had been vio-
lated. (R. 4, 5). 
7. The case was tried before the Honorable Homer 
Wilkinson beginning May 18, 1987. Lorenc's complaint was dis-
missed. (R. 103-104). 
8. The trial court adopted Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law July 2, 1987. (R. 96-104). 
9. The trial court reached Lorenc's state law and con-
stitutional claims and decided both claims against Lorenc. (R. 
96-104). 
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10. The appellate court ruled that the Granite Policy 
was facially invalid and did not reach Lorenc's constitutional 
claims. Lorenc, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. 
11. The appellate court awarded fees to Lorenc pursu-
ant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1988. Lorenc, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
10. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD SETTLE WHEN ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY BE GRANTED 
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. S 1988. 
There are numerous federal cases concerning when a pre-
vailing party is entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 even though the trial court has not reached the 
merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claim. Although an 
extremely important issue for both plaintiffs and defendants, 
that issue has never been addressed by this Court. Furthermore, 
the Amended Opinion in this case rendered by the court of appeals 
conflicts with federal case law concerning this issue. Accord-
ingly, this Court should grant Granite's petition for certiorari. 
Lorenc correctly argues that a prevailing party may be^  
entitled to an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
even when the Court does not reach the constitutional issues giv-
ing rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Smith v. Robinson, 
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468 U.S. 992, 1006-1007, 82 L. Ed. 2d 746, 104 S. Ct. 3457 
(1984). That entitlement does not arise, however, unless: 
(a) Plaintiff is the "prevailing party"; and 
(b) The state claim on which the plaintiff pre-
vails arises from a common nucleus of operative fact 
with the constitutional claim. 
Ld.; Bunting v. City of Columbia, 639 F.2d 1090, 1093 (4th Cir. 
1981). Lorenc's claim for attorney's fees fails because neither 
of these prerequisite are met. The relationship between those 
prerequisites and the facts of this case, however, was not 
addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
A. Lorenc is Not a Prevailing Party Under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
Because the Trial Court Denied Her Constitutional 
Claim, 
Lorenc is not the "prevailing party" for purposes of 42 
U.S.C. S 1988. Lorenc's Petition for Rehearing and the court 
below rely on the longstanding judicial policy of avoiding a 
decision on constitutional issues if the case can be decided on 
statutory grounds as justification for granting attorney's fees 
to Lorenc pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1988. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 
U.S. 122, 133 n.15, 65 L. Ed. 2d 653, 100 S.Ct. 2570 (1980). 
The rationale for authorizing a fee award for an unaddressed con-
stitutional claim is to avoid penalizing a litigant for the 
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court's reluctance to consider a constitutional claim when there 
is a dispositive state claim. E.g., Smith, 468 U.S. at 1107. 
The rationale explained in Smith is only applicable, 
however, when the trial court does not reach the constitutional 
claim, since the effect of this practice is to allow the trial 
court to assume that the plaintiff has prevailed on his 
"fee-generating" constitutional claim. Jki. That rationale does 
not apply in this case because the trial court denied Lorenc's 
4/ 
constitutional claim.- The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law provide: 
The Granite School District hearing procedure meets the 
legal requirements of notice; presentation of evidence, 
representation by legal counsel and a final written 
decision. 
i/ The constitutional violations alleged by Lorenc were plead 
as follows: 
18. Plaintiff has been denied her right to due 
process of law and equal protection of law, as guaran-
teed by the Utah Constitution and the United States 
Constitution in that: 
(a) she has been denied the opportunity to 
have an appeal hearing to contest the denial of 
her request for fee waivers; and 
(b) she has been denied such fee waivers 
even though elegible for the waivers under state 
law and rules of the Utah State Board of 
Education. 
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The fee waiver policy as implemented by Granite School 
District meets the requirements of the law and of the 
statutory authority for determination of a student's 
inability to pay the fees appropriately assessed, 
• • • 
The Granite School District did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in determining plaintiff's ability to pay 
a portion of the student fees assessed, 
(R. 101 at HH 7, 3, 8). Hence, Lorenc cannot rely on the fact 
that she prevailed on the state claim as support for her fee 
claim. 
Federal courts have declined an attorney's fees award 
in similar cases, Luria Bros, & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347, 357 
(3rd Cir. 1982); Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 
1980); Raley v. Fraser, 747 F.2d 287, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1984). 
The facts in Luria are similar to the ones in this case. Luria 
lost on his S 1983 claim but prevailed on his state claim. He 
then asserted entitlement to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1983, 1988 because he had prevailed under state law. The 
Third Circuit Court held, however, that Luria was not the pre-
vailing party for purposes of Section 1983 because he had failed 
on his constitutional claim. Luria, 672 F.2d at 357. Accord 
Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1980) (attorney's 
fees under 42 U.S.C. S 1988 are not justified where plaintiff has 
lost on a constitutional issue after trial). 
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In all of the cases cited by Lorenc or the court in 
support of the fee award in this case, the constitutional claim 
was either not reached by the trial court or reached and decided 
in plaintiff's favor. This is a different case which does not 
permit the same result. Although the appellate court did not 
reach Lorenc's constitutional claim, the claim was considered and 
denied by the trial court. Lorenc is not entitled to prevailing 
party status under § 1983 and is, therefore, not entitled to an 
attorney's fee award. 
B. The State Claim on Which Lorenc Prevailed Did Not Arise 
from the Same Operative Facts as Lorenc's Constitu-
tional Claim, 
An award of attorney's fees to Lorenc is also improper 
because a prevailing party cannot rely on a substantial, 
unaddressed constitutional claim as the basis for an award of 
attorney's fees unless both the constitutional claim and the 
state claim on which plaintiff prevails arise from a common 
nucleus of operative facts. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n.7 
(1976). Fees are not awarded when the claim on which plaintiff 
prevails is based on distinctly different facts and legal theo-
ries than the unaddressed constitutional claim. Texas Teachers 
Assoc, v. Garland Independent School Dist.y 489 U.S. , 103 L. 
Ed. 2d 866, 875, 109 S.Ct. 1486 (1989); Smith v. Robinson, 468 
U.S. at 1006. See also Lofft v. State Board of Higher Education, 
-15-
89 Or. App. 614, 750 P.2d 515 (1988) (attorney's fees were 
awarded under Section 1988 to a plaintiff whose constitutional 
claim was not reached because plaintiff relied on the same 
actions of defendant to make out both the constitutional claim 
and the state claim on which plaintiff prevailed). 
In this casef the operative facts supporting the claim 
decided by the appellate court do not also support Lorenc's con-
stitutional claim. The Court of Appeals invalidated the Granite 
Policy solely on the basis that the language was more restrictive 
than the language of the State Policy. See Lorencr 129 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 6. The decision did not address application of the Gran-
5/ . . . 
ite Policy,— the appeal procedure which Lorenc claimed was vio-
lative of due process and equal protection or whether Lorenc 
would have been eligible for a waiver under the State Policy. 
There is only one fact underlying the appellate courtfs 
decision — that the State Policy includes language including 
students whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay 
while the Granite Policy does not. Compare Granite Policy with 
State Policy. From this single fact, the court concluded 
Granite still contends that its application of the Granite 
Policy had the same effect as the more general wording of 
the State Policy. 
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that the Granite Policy conflicts with state law. 
The operative facts concerning Lorenc's constitutional 
claim are quite different because they include all of the facts 
related implementation of the Granite Policy, They include all 
of the facts concerning Lorenc's waiver application, Granite's 
general procedures concerning waiver applications, Granite's 
response to Lorenc's individual situation, the notices Lorenc 
received, the details concerning scheduling for Lorenc's appeal 
hearing, Lorenc's financial situation, the evidence Lorenc was 
allowed to present at each hearing with Granite officials, and 
the dates of all relevant actions by both parties.-
The operative facts for the claim on which Lorenc pre-
vailed are not the same as the constitutional claim she alleges 
£/ Consideration of these facts would have demonstrated that a 
four month hiatus between Lorenc's first and second hearings 
was not a denial of due process, and that any delay in 
scheduling Lorenc's appeal hearing was not caused by Granite 
but by Lorenc's attorney's cancellation of two previously 
scheduled dates. Consideration of the facts would further 
show that Lorenc's children were not denied any privileges 
during this four month period, and that the partial fee 
waiver and the work credit option offered to Lorenc would 
have allowed her children to participate without paying any 
fee whatsoever. The Granite Policy as applied to Lorenc was 
consistent with the State Policy, and there was no denial of 
a property right or right to be heard. 
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under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. As a result, she is not entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE STATE POLICY ALLOWS 
PARTIAL FEE WAIVERS. 
The second issue before this Court is whether the Court 
of Appeals correctly decided that the language of the State Pol-
icy does not permit a partial fee waiver. This is an important 
issue in education which should also be addressed by this Court. 
The Board's rules define waiver as "Release from the 
requirement of payment of a fee and from any provision in lieu of 
fee payment." Utah Admin. Code R. 300-407-1F (1987-88). The 
Court of Appeals ruled that such definition did not allow for a 
reduction of fee payments or allow a partial waiver. 
That conclusion is inconsistent with the policy under-
lying fee waivers. Waivers are provided because students should 
be allowed to participate in school activities regardless of the 
financial ability of the family. The State Policy, in fact, 
provides: 
A board of education shall provide, as part of any fee 
policy or schedule for, adequate waivers or other pro-
visions to ensure that no student is denied the oppor-
tunity to participate in a class or school-sponsored or 
supported activity because of an inability to pay a 
fee. 
That provision is mirrored in Granite's fee policy which 
requires: 
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The local board of education shall provide, as part of 
any fee policy or schedule, for adequate waivers or 
other revisions to insure that no student is denied the 
opportunity to participate in a class or 
school-sponsored or supported activity because of a 
demonstrated inability to pay a fee. 
The practice of granting partial fee waivers in situa-
tions where a family does not qualify for a full waiver is con-
sistent with these policies. Financial relief by way of a waiver 
is available not only to families who are unable to pay any fee 
at all but are also available to those who are unable to pay only 
a portion of the fee. In all cases where a family is not eligi-
ble for a full waiver but still financially needy, the partial 
waiver policy implements the State Policy by reducing the fee to 
an amount the family is financially able to pay. 
Partial waivers should be encouraged instead of invali-
dated. If a school district is not allowed to provide a partial 
waiver, its only alternative for a student who does not qualify 
for a full waiver is to deny the waiver application. It is 
incongruous for the Court to sanction that result by invalidating 
partial waivers and thereby harm the category of people which fee 
waiver policies are designed to protect. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals has rendered a decision concerning 
application of 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1988 which is inconsistent with 
federal case law. This is an important issue which should be 
addressed and clarified by this Court. 
The Court of Appeals also held that the language of the 
State Policy does not permit partial fee waivers. This, too, is 
a significant issue which has not yet been addressed by this 
Court. Granite's Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be granted 
to resolve these timely and important issues. 
DATED this rY day of April 1990. 
M. Byron fisher 
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party to bear their own costs herein 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment to 
Bruce A. Plenk, Attorney for Plaintiff, Utah Legal Services, 
Inc., 124 South Fourth East, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this Q day of June, 1987. 
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M. Byron Fisher, A1082 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GWEN LORENC, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
JOHN REED CALL, in his : Civil No. C-87-01032 
official capacity as Judge Homer Wilkinson 
Superintendent of Schools : 
of the Granite School District, 
and THE BOARD OF EDUCATION : 
OF GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendants. 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Homer 
Wilkiinson on May 18, 1987. The parties were present. Bruce A. 
Plenk represented plaintiff. M. Byron Fisher represented defen-
dants. The Court received evidence and testimony, the matter was 
argued to the Court on May 19, 1987 and submitted for decision. 
The Court being fully advised, and the parties having filed Memo-
randa to the Court, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County and of 
the Granite School District. 
a(inr^G 
2. Plaintiff is a single parent having been divorced. 
Plaintiff was awarded custody of her six minor children. Perti-
nent to these proceedings, Catherine is 17 years of age and a 
senior at Granger High School, Michael Lorenc is 15 years of age 
and in the 9th grade at West Lake Junior High School, and Brandi 
is 13 years of age and in the 7th grade at West Lake Junior High 
School. 
3. During the 1986-87 school year, Koarns High School 
assessed fees for students of book rental $25 ($10 refundable), 
after-school activity fee $15 (optional), yearbook $20 (optional) 
and for Catherine to take a personal finance class $6 for a con-
sumable workbook, $32 graduation car and gown rental (optional). 
4. During the 1986-87 s jol year, West Lake Junior 
High School assessed its students book rental $25 ($10 refund-
able), after-school activity fee $5 (optional), memory book and 
for Michael $13 woodwork shop expenses for class project 
materials. 
5. In 1986, the State legislature enacted legislation 
as to a state policy regarding student fees, deposits or other 
charges, (53-7a-l, U.C., 86-87) and a fee waiver provision 
(53-7a-2, U.C., 86-87). 
6. In response to the legislative mandate, in July, 
1986, the State School Board of Education adopted Rules and Regu-




7. In July, 1986, Granite School District adopted 
rules and regulations for a school district fee schedule and fee 
waiver policy by adopting the State regulations and implementing 
the school district policy. 
8. In the fee waiver section of the legislation 
(53-7a-2, U.C., 86-87), the legislature did not define the crite-
ria necessary to determine a fee waiver as to when a student 
would be allowed to "participate because of an inability to pay 
the required fee." 
9. The State Board of Education failed to provide any 
criteria in its Rules and Regulations as to the determination of 
"inability to pay" except as to those students who were partici-
pants in State aid programs. 
10. The State Board of Education failed to provide any 
regulations as to partial fee waivers. 
11. Granite School District Board of Education prop-
erly assumed the responsibility to establish its own regulations 
to determine a reasonable basis for fee waivers and to determine 
whether a student was unable to pay the fees as assessed. 
12. Granite School District fee policy conforms to the 
statutory requirements and the State Regulations in that 
a. Book rental fees are appropriate fees to be 
assessed. 
be After school activity fees may be charged as long 
as these charges are optional to the student. 
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c. Fees for classes may be charged for consumable 
materials or materials to be taken by the student from the 
school sue;, ^.s class wor ooks id materials used in a stu-
dent pro;, .t such as wood shop or art class, 
d. Fees for yearbooks and memory books are appropriate 
charges since these items are optional to the student. 
e. Fees for caps and gowns are not school charges and 
should not be handled as a school charge. 
13. The Granite School District fee waiver policy con-
forms to the statutory requirements. 
14. Plaintiff was not a recipient of state or public 
assistance t thp time these charges were assessed. 
i5. Plaint . made application for consideration of a 
fee waiver for her children. 
16. At the time of this action, plaintiff was employed 
making approximately $1,300 per month income. 
17. Plaintiff has not sought to enforce the child sup-
port payments from the children1s father which were awarded in 
Decree of Divorce but did request assistance to pay night class 
fees. 
18. Catherine has taken night school classes and has 
paid $125 tuition for those classes, $50 of which came from the 
child's natural father when plaintiff requested his assistance. 
19. Plaintiff requested a fee waiver for Catherine at 




20. The request for fee waiver pursuant to the School 
District fee waiver policy was heard by the Superintendent's 
designee in November, 1986, and at plaintiff's request was 
reheard in February, 1987. 
21. The hearing officer recommended a partial fee 
waiver for plaintiff's children based upon plaintiff's income and 
the fact that plaintiff did not qualify for and had not obtained 
assistance from State or Federal aid programs or from private aid 
programs. 
22. The School District fee waiver policy as imple-
mented meets with the statutory requirement of determining a 
student's inability to pay the assessed appropriate fees. 
23. Partial fee waivers are appropriate in this situa-
tion based upon the School District regulations which were imple-
mented for matters which the State School Board failed to regu-
late and for which guidelines were not provided. 
24. Notice of the School District fee waiver policy to 
plaintiff was adequate and met the State guidelines. 
25. Fee waiver policies should apply to fees charged 
for school sponsored activities such as after school activity 
fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the claims herein 
and the parties hereto. 
2. The charging of fees to students as outlined herein 
were appropriate fees and are not an abrogation of the 
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constitutional right to a free education as provided in the Con-
stitution of the State of Utah. 
3. The fee policy as implemented by the Granite School 
District met the requirements of the law and the regulatory 
requirements of the State Board of Education. 
4. Tre fee waiver policy as implemented by Granite 
School District meets the requirements of the law and of the 
statutory authority for determination of a student's inability to 
pay the fees appropriately assessed. 
5. The State Board of Education Rules and Regulations 
are deficient in providing the school district with guidelines in 
the fee waiver regulations to 1) give notice to students of 
waiver policies, 2) determine a student's inability to pay, 3) 
establishing a hearing procedure to review requests for fee 
waiver, 4) in providing for partial fee waivers. 
6. The Granite School District acted properly and 
within the statutory authorization to establish regulations and 
procedures to meet the requirements of the law which the State 
Board of Education failed to establish. 
7. The Granite School District hearing procedure meets 
the legal requirements of notice, presentation of evidence, rep-
resentation by legal counsel and a final written decision. 
8. The Granite School District did not act arbitrarily 
or capriciously in determining plaintiff's ability to pay a por-
tion of the student fees assessed. 
-6-
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9. Plaintiff should pay the fees as assessed under the 
partial fee waiv-- :• *^ -\,,' by the hearing officer. 
10. Fee waivers should not apply to optional charges 
and charges for consumable materials such as consumable wnrk 
books and wood shop projects which are taken by the student. 
11. Judgment should be entered for defendants, no 
cause of action, each party should assume their own costs 





H. DIXON Hs.w^Y 
Bruc£ A. Plenk 
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John Reed Call, in his official 
capacity as Superintendent of 
Schools of the Granite School 
District; and the Board of 
of Education of Granite School 
District, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Caae No. 890286-CA 
Hoormn 
f t * Court 
M * t C « M t « Appeals 
Attorneys Bruce M. Plenk, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
ML Byron Fisher, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals an adverse judgment entered on her 
complaint alleging that defendants* former fee waiver policy 
violated state law and board of education rules. We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
At the inception of the 1986-87 school year, plaintiff Gwen 
Lorenc was a single parent of six minor children, three of whom 
attended secondary schools in the Granite School District 
(District). Prior to the commencement of classes, the District 
advised plaintiff and other parents that fees would be imposed 
on students for various activities, books, and materials. The 
District subsequently assessed plaintiff a total of almost $200 
in fees for her three secondary school students. On September 
5, 1986, plaintiff contacted the high school principal and 
applied for a waiver of fees on the basis of financial 
hardship. She was denied a waiver, and was referred to the 
District's fee waiver administrator. The administrator 
subsequently met with plaintiff and determined that she was 
eligible for a "partial waiver.H Plaintiff appealed this 
decision to the District, requesting a hearing. No hearing was 
scheduled# however, until after plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in 
Third District Court. 
On March 9, 1987, the District conducted a formal hearing 
in which plaintiff was represented by counsel and was permitted 
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. After the 
hearing, plaintiff's application for a full waiver was again 
denied by the District. 
Plaintiff's lawsuit proceeded to trial before Judge Homer 
F. Wilkinson on May 18-19, 1987. After hearing the evidence, 
Judge Wilkinson determined that the District's fee policy 
conformed to state law and the rules promulgated by the Utah 
State Board of Education (Board). In awarding judgment to 
defendants. Judge Wilkinson concluded that the Board's rules 
did not address certain aspects of fee waivers, and that 
because the District policy properly addressed those issues, it 
was valid. 
VALIDITY OF DISTRICT POLICY 
Plaintiff claims that the District's fee waiver policy is 
more restrictive than the policy established by the Board's 
rules, and is thus invalid. The Board's rules provide, in 
pertinent part: 
A board of education shall provide, as 
part of any fee policy or schedule, for 
adequate waivers or other provisions to 
ensure that no student is denied the 
opportunity to participate in a class or 
school-sponsored or supported activity 
because of an inability to pay a fee. 
The waiver policy shall include 
procedures to ensure that: 
2 
(4) fee waivers or other provisions in 
lieu of fee waivers are available to alI 
students who are in state custody or 
receiving public assistance in the form ui 
aid to dependent children, general relief, 
supplemental security income, or foster 
care, and others whose parents or guardians 
are financial! y unable to pay, 
Utah Admin, Code R 300-407-6(A) ( 4 "» (1987-88). 
The District's policy in effect liuiimj time iyBfe-a? school 
year provided, in pertinent part: 
Fees, as identified by the Granite 
School District Board of Education, will be 
waived in accord with Utah State Board of 
Education standards for students whose 
parents or legal guardians are the 
recipients of public assistance in the form 
of Aid to Dependent Children, General 
Relief, Supplemental Security Income, Foster 
Care, or other benefits provided through the 
Department of Social Services due to a 
limited financial ability within the 
family. (The receipt of unemployment 
compensation and/or free or reduced price 
school lunches does not constitute public 
assistance as above defined.) 
A d n u n i sr r ** + ••-• ; 
Plaintiff asserts that the District's fee waiver: policy 
unduly restricted waivers to recipients of certain welfare 
program benefits and lacked measures for preventing delay, for 
reviewing waiver alternatives, and for processing appeals. In 
comparison, the Board's rules do not limit fee waivers to 
recipients of public assistance, but provide waivers to "others 
whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay." 
1. Though not pertinent to this proceeding, Administrative 
Memorandum No. 24 was amended September 18, 1989, to make fee 
waivers available for all students financially unable to pay. 
PlfnnHff co_n_cedes that the assessment of fees for 
secondary school students is constitutional. See Utah Const. 
art. X^ . § 2.2 Plaintiff__also_accepts as valid the statutory 
provisions enacted in 1986 permitting local school districts to 
authorize student fees under rules adopted by the Board, and 
the statutory waiver policy for such. fees. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 53A-* 2-102," -103 (1989).3 Furthermore, plaintiff does not 
2. At times pertinent to this dispute, Utah Const, art. X, § 2 
provided: 
The common schools shall be free. The 
other departments of the system shall be 
supported as provided by law. 
"Common schools" has been interpreted to mean grades one 
through eight. Logan Citv School Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 
342, 349, 77 P.2d 348, 351 (1938). Article X, § 2 was amended, 
effective July 1, 1987, to read: 
Public elementary and secondary schools 
shall be free, except the Legislature may 
authorize the imposition of fees in the 
secondary schools. 
3- Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-102 (1989)—State policy on student 
fees, deposits, or other charges. 
(1) A fee, deposit, or other charge may not be made, 
or any expenditure required of a student or the student's 
parent or guardian, as a condition for student participation in 
an activity, class, or program provided, sponsored, or 
supported by or through a public school or school district, 
unless aut1 rized by the local school board under rules adopted 
by the Sta * Board of Education. 
(2) A fee, deposit, charge, or expenditure may not be 
required for elementary school activities which are part of the 
regular school day or fcr materials used during the regular 
school day. 
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-l (Supp. 1987) (amendments 
reflect minor changes in phraseology)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989)—Waiver of fees. 
A local school board shall require, as part of an 
authorization granted under Section 53A-12-102, that adequate 
waivers or other provisions are available to ensure that no 
student is denied the opportunity to participate because of an 
inability to pay the required fee, deposit, or charge. 
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-2 (Supp. 1987) (amendments 
reflect minor changes in phraseology)). 
challenge the rules promulgated by the Board to implement 
sections 53A-1 2-102 and -101, 
We begin, our analysis by reiterating the standard under 
which we review a trial court's conclusions of law we accord 
them "no particular deference, but review them for 
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242, 244 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 
Rules may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the 
statute creating the right or imposing the duty." Crowther v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co,, 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (quoting IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1975)). A policy becomes a rule if "it conforms to the 
definition of a rule.- Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(10)(b) 
(1989), A policy thus more restrictive than the rule 
promulgated under section 53A-12-103, abrogates the 
legislature's objective in ensuring "that no student is denied 
the opportunity to participate because of an inability to pay 
the required fee[s]." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989), 
When such administrative regulations and policies "conflict 
with the design of an Act," we have a duty to invalidate them. 
Crpwthgr, 762 P.2d at 1122 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Barnes, 191 Colo. 278, 552 P*2d 300, 30^ MQ7m\ 
In this case, the trial court concluded that "[t]he fee 
waiver policy as implemented by Granite School District meets 
the requirements of the law and of the statutory authority for 
determination of a student's inability to pay the fees 
appropriately assessed." However, the District's policy limits 
the waiver of fees to those families receiving public 
assistance. This is clearly more restrictive than the Board's 
regulation waiving fees for students whose families do not 
receive public assistance but are still unable to pay. 
The District's practice in granting partial fee waivers is 
also contrary to the Board's rules. Those rules define 
"waiver" as, "Release from the requirement of payment of a fee 
and from any provision in lieu of fee payment.- Utah Admin. 
Code R. 300-407-1F (1987-88). We believe this language is 
capable of but one interpretation—a student is either eligible 
for a fee waiver or not. No provision is made for the 
reduction of fee payments or for the imposition of partial fees. 
We conclude that the policy issued by the District on July 
1986, was more restrictive than the Board"s rules on fee 
waivers it was designed to implement. Since the resulting 
policy conflicts with the statutory objective of ensuring 
student participation by all those unable to pay, we invalidate 
the District's po . ,cy. 
In view of ou holding, we need not reach plaintiff's due 
process claim* See Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 
1980) (constitutional questions are not to be addressed where 
the merits can be determined on other grounds); see also State 
v. Llovd A. Frv Roofing Co., 9 Or. App. 189, 495 P.2d 751, 754 
(1972) (the presumption of constitutionality accorded to 
legislation extends to rules proraui-ited by administrative 
bodies exercising legislative powers).4 
ATTORNEY FEES 
In her appeal, plaintiff claims attorney fees under the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1988 (1981). This ederal prov; sion permits an award of 
attorney fees, in th trial court *s discretion, to the 
prevailing party in any proceeding brought under section 1983 
and other sections of that title. T*. Although such claims 
are not limited to cases pursued in 3deral courts, a party 
must plead a claim under the adera civil rights provisions in 
order for there to be a basis for an award of attorney fees. 
See Application of Fobison, 107 Idaho 1055, 695 P.2d 440, 442 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985). 
Whether plaintiff's complaint states a claim for relief 
under section 1983 is a question of law. Brule v. Southworth, 
611 F.2d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). "To state a claim for relief under 
4. Plaintiff also alleges that the District promulgated an 
unannounced fee waiver -policy- and takes issue with that 
policy on due process and equal protection grounds. The record 
is unclear whether the District had officially adopted such a 
policy, although there is testimony from the fee administrator 
that he had drafted a policy less restrictive than the 
announced policy, but still more restrictive than that of the 
Board. We merely note that any policy that conflicts wi^h the 
rules remains invalid, and that all local school board -rules 
and policies" must be -in writing, filed, and referenced for 
public access.- Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(14) (1989); see 
also Athay v. Department of Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965, 
968 (Utah 1981) (failure to publish guidelines constituted 
arbitrary action in violation of due process). 
section 1983, a
 COmplainant need allege only (1) that some 
person deprived complainant of a right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such person 
acted under color of state law.- International Soc'v for 
Krishna Consciousness. Inc. v. Colorado State Fair, 673 P.2d 
368, 373 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (citing Gomez v. Toledo. 446 
U.S. 635 (1980)). 
Plaintiff alleges in this case that the imposition of 
student fees on those not receiving public assistance, but 
still unable to pay, infringes on her children's right to a 
free education. However, this is not a right, privilege or 
immunity secured by the federal constitution. See Plvler v. 
Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1982) ("Public education is not a 
•right1 granted to individuals by the Constitution.") (citing 
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 34 
(1973)), reh'o denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). Plaintiff has 
thus failed to state a claim for relief under section 1983. In 
the absence of an applicable statute or agreement, see Cobabe 
v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) , plaintiff 
is not entitled to her attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now 
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the opinion filed herein. 
Opinion of the Court by RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge; JUDITH M. 
BILLINGS, and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judges, concur 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of December, 1989, a true 
nd correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was deposited in the United 
tates mail or personally delivered to each of the above parties. 
DtfputyClerk 
RIAL COURT: 
alt Lake County, Third District Court. Case No. C-8701032 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
0 0 O 0 0 • 
Gwen Lorenc, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John Reed Call, i n hi s official 
capacity as Superintendent of 
Schools of the Granite School 
District; and the Board of 
of Education of Granite School 
District, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: Bruce M. Plenk, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
M, Byron Fisher, Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Bench, Billings,» and Greenwood. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals an adverse judgment denying her claims 
that defendants' former fee waiver policy and procedures 
violated state law, board of education rules, and the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. We reverse and remand. 
We note that this opinion is issued in place of our prior 
opinion in this case, Lorenc v. Call, 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 
(Ct. App. 1989), which was vacated on March 6, 1990. As a 
result of a petition for rehearing in this case, we have 
concluded that our previous opinion was in error on the issue 
of plaintiff's right to recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.CA. 
§ 1988 (1981), and therefore grant the relief requested in 
plaintiff's petition for rehearing. 
AMENDED OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 89Q2R6-CA 
FACTS 
At the inception of the 19'-- 7 school y-ar, p intiff Gwen 
Lorenc was a single parent of si^ . minor chil ren, airee of waorn 
attended secondary schools in the Granite School District 
(District). Prior to the commencement of classes, the District 
advised plaintiff and other parents that fees would be imposed 
on students for various activities, books, and materials. The 
District subsequently assessed plaintiff a total of almost $2'-0 
in fees for her three secondary school students. 
On September 5, 1986, plaintiff contacted the high school 
principal to request a waiver of fees on the basis of financial 
hardship. No written rules or regulations were distributed to 
parents in order to guide plaintiff as to how she might qualify 
for a fee waiver. She was denied a waiver, and was referred to 
the District's fee waiver administrator to appeal the 
decision. The administrator merely met with plaintiff and 
determined that she was eligible for a "partial waiver" under 
an unpublished policy providing for "partial waivers." This 
appeal "hearing" was conducted with no formal notice and 
without written procedures. Plaintiff appealed the partial 
waiver of fees decision to the District, requesting a formal 
hearing. No formal hearing was scheduled, however, until more 
than six months la r, after plaintiff sought a declaratory 
judgment and preli inary and permanent injunctive relief in 
Third District Court. 
On March 9, 1987, the District conducted a formal hearing 
in which plaintiff was represented by counsel and was permitted 
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. After the 
hearing, plaintiff's application for a full waiver was again 
denied by the District. 
Plaintiff's lawsuit proceeded to trial on May 18-19, x387. 
After hearing the evidence, the trial court determined that the 
District's fee policy conformed to state law and the rules 
promulgated by the Utah State Board of Education (Board) and 
provided adequate notice and procedural protections to those 
wishing to seek fee waivers. 
VALIDITY OF DISTRICT POLICY 
Plaintiff claims that the District's fee waiver policy is 
more restrictive than the policy established by the Board':: 
rules, and is thus invalid. The Board's rules provide, in 
pertinent part: 
A board of education shall provide, as 
part of any fee policy or schedule, for 
adequate waivers or other provisions to 
ensure that no student is denied the 
opportunity to participate in a class or 
school-sponsored or supported activity 
because of an inability to pay a fee. 
The waiver policy shall include 
procedures to ensure that: 
(4) fee waivers or other provisions in 
lieu of fee waivers are available to all 
students who are in state custody or 
receiving public assistance in the form of 
aid to dependent children, general relief, 
supplemental security income, or foster 
care, and others whose parents or guardians 
are financially unable to pay. 
Utah Admin. Code R. 300-407-6(A)(4) (1987-88). 
The District's policy in effect during the 1986-87 school 
year provided, in pertinent part: 
Fees, as identified by the Granite 
School District Board of Education, will 
be waived in accord with Utah State Board 
of Education standards for students whose 
parents or legal guardians are the 
recipients of public assistance in the 
form of Aid to Dependent Children, General 
Relief, Supplemental Security Income, 
Foster Care, or other benefits provided 
through the Department of Social Services 
due to a limited financial ability within 
the family. (The receipt of unemployment 
compensation and/or free or reduced price 
school lunches does not constitute public 
assistance as above definede) 
Administrative Memorandum No. 24, July 29, 1986.1 
1. Though not pertinent to this proceeding, Administrative 
Memorandum No. 24 was amended September 18, 1989, to make fee 
waivers available for all students financially unable to pay. 
Plaintiff asserts that the District's fee waiver policy 
unduly restricted waiters to recipients of certain welfare 
program benefits and lacked measures for preventing delay, for 
reviewing wai/er alt -natives, and for processing appeals. In 
comparison, the Boaru's rules do not limit fee waivers to 
recipients of public assistance, but provide waivers to "others 
whose parents or guardians are financially unable to pay." 
Plaintiff concedes that the assessment of fees for 
secondary school students is constitutional. See Utah Const, 
art. X, § 2.2 Plaintiff also accepts as valid the statutory 
provisions enacted in 1986 permitting local school districts to 
authorize student fees under rules adopted by the Board, and 
the statutory waiver policy for such fees. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 53A-12-102, -103 (1989).3 Furthermore, plaintiff does not 
challenge the rules promulgated by the Board to implement 
sections 53A-12-102 and -103. 
2. At times pertinent to this dispute, Utah Const, art. X, § 2 
provided: 
The common schools shall be free. The 
other departments of the system shall be 
supported as provided by law. 
"Common schc Is" has been in^arpreted to mean grades one 
through eight. Logan City Schoo i Dist. v. Kowallis, 94 Utah 
342, 349, 77 P.2d 348, 351 (1938). Article X, § 2 was amended, 
effective July 1, 1987, to read: 
Public elementary and secondary schools 
shall be free, except the Legislature may 
authorize the imposition of fees in the 
secondary schools. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-102 (1989)—State policy on student 
fees, deposits, or other c .rges. 
(1) A fee, eposit, or other charge 
may not be made, or any expenditure 
required of a student or the student's 
parent or guardian, as a condition for 
student participation in an activity, 
class, or program p ovided, sponsored, or 
supported by or through a public school or 
school district, unless authorized by the 
local school board under rules adopted by 
the State Board of Education. 
We begin our analysis by reiterating the standard under 
which we review a trial court's conclusions of law: we accord 
them "no particular deference, but review them for 
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242, 244 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Rules may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify the 
statute creating the right or imposing the duty." Crowther v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (quoting IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 Pc2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1975)). A policy becomes a rule if "it conforms to the 
definition of a rule." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(10)(b) 
(1989). A policy thus more restrictive than the rule 
promulgated under section 53A-12-103, abrogates the 
legislature's objective in ensuring "that no student is denied 
the opportunity to participate because of an inability to pay 
the required fee[s]." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989). 
When such administrative regulations and policies "conflict 
with the design of an Act," we have a duty to invalidate them. 
Crowther, 762 P.2d at 1122 (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Barnes, 191 Colo. 278, 552 P.2d 300, 303 (1976)). 
(footnote 3 continued) 
(2) A fee, deposit, charge, or expenditure 
may not be required for elementary school 
activities which are part of the regular 
school day or for materials used during 
the regular school day. 
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-l (Supp. 1987) (amendments 
reflect minor changes in phraseology)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-12-103 (1989)--Waiver of fees. 
A local school board shall require, as 
part of an authorization granted under 
Section 53A-12-102, that adequate waivers 
or other provisions are available to 
ensure that no student is denied the 
opportunity to participate because of an 
inability to pay the required fee, 
deposit, or charge. 
(Formerly Utah Code Ann. § 53-7a-2 (Supp. 1987) (amendments 
reflect minor changes in phraseology)). 
In this case, the trial court concluded that "[t]he fee 
waiver policy as implemented by Granite School District meets 
t .e requirements of the law and of the statutory authority for 
determination of a student's inability to pay the fees 
appropriately assessed." However, the District's policy limits 
the waiver of fees to those families receiving public 
assistance. This is clearly more restrictive than the Board's 
regulation waiving fees for students whose families do not 
receive public assistance but are still unable to pay. 
The District's practice in granting partial fee waivers is 
also contrary to the Board's rules. Those rules define 
"waiver" as, "[r]elease from the requirement of payment of a 
fee and from any provision in lieu of fee payment." Utah 
Admin. Code R. 300-407-1F (1987-88). We believe this language 
is capable of but one interpretation—a student is either 
eligible for a fee waiver or not. No provision is made for the 
reduction of fee payments or for the imposition of partial fees. 
We conclude that the policy issued by the District on July 
16, 1986, was more restrictive than the Board's rules on fee 
waivers it was designed to implement. Since the resulting 
policy conflicts with the statutory objective of ensuring 
student participation by all those unable to pay, we invalidate 
the District's policy. 
In view of our holding, we need not reach plaintiff's due 
process claim. See Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 
1980) (constitutional questions are not to be addressed where 
the merits can be determined on other grounds).4 
4. Plaintiff also alleges that the District promulgated an 
unannounced fee waiver "policy" and takes issue with this 
secret policy on due process and equal protection grounds. The 
record is unclear whether the District had officially adopted 
such a policy, although there is testimony from the fee 
administrator that he had drafted a policy less restrictive 
than the announced policy, bu*- still more restrictive than that 
of the Board. We merely note chat any policy that conflicts 
with the rules remains invalid, and that all local school board 
"rules and policies" must be "in writing, filed, and referenced 
for public access." Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(14) (1989); see 
also Athav v. Department of Business Regulation, 626 P.2d 965 
968 (Utah 1981) (failure to publish guidelines constituted 
arbitrary action in violation of due process). 
ATTORNEY FEES 
In her appeal, plaintiff claims attorney fees under the 
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1988 (1981). This federal provision permits an award of 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any proceeding brought 
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and other sections of the civil rights 
title. Id. Although such claims are not limited to cases 
pursued in federal courts, a party must plead a federal civil 
rights claim to qualify for an award of attorney fees. See 
Application of Robison, 107 Idaho 1055, 695 P.2d 440, 442 (Ct. 
App. 1985). 
Whether plaintiffs complaint states a claim for relief 
under section 1983 is a question of law. Brule v. Southworth, 
611 F.2d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). "To state a claim for relief under 
section 1983, a complainant need allege only (1) that some 
person deprived complainant of a right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such person 
acted under color of state law." International Soc'y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair, 673 P.2d 
368, 373 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 
U.S. 635 (1980)). 
Plaintiff, in the second cause of action of her complaint, 
alleged that the District had denied her due process and equal 
protection of the laws as provided for under the fourteenth 
amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 7 
of the Utah Constitution. She specifically complained that the 
procedure utilized by the District for fee waivers denied her a 
timely and fair initial hearing and appeal on her request for a 
fee waiver. At the trial below and likewise on appeal, 
plaintiff's constitutional claims were further developed. 
Plaintiff argues that the fee waiver policy of the District not 
only violated controlling Utah law and regulations, but also 
that, as implemented, it violated the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff complains that the District's 
unwritten waiver policy, the lack of any formal appeal 
procedures, and the Board's long delay in finally dealing with 
her claims violated her constitutional rights. We conclude 
plaintiff has stated a constitutional claim for relief under 
section 1983. 
In our decision today, we invalidate the District's policy 
because we find that it conflicts with state law. As a result, 
we do not reach plaintiff's constitutional claims. However, it 
does not automatically follow that plaintiff cannot recover her 
attorney fee~ under section 1988. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held thit 
a plaintiff is generally entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under section 1988 if the plaintiff prevails on a statutory, 
non-civil-rights claim which is pendent to a substantial 
constitutional claim and vhich arises from a "common nucleus of 
operative fact." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 (1984); 
Maher v. Gaane, 448 U.S. 122, 133 n.15 (1980). See also S. 
Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts § 23.2(a) 
(1988) (footnotes omitted).5 
In Maher, the plaintiff alleged that Connecticut's Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children regulations violated the 
Social Security Act and the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff prevailed in a 
consent decree on her statutory claim. The Supreme Court 
nevertheless upheld the district court's award of her counsel 
fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 
1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). Maher, 448 U.S. at 133. The 
Court approved the "award of fees in a case in which the 
5. The author states, 
In authorizing fee awards to parties 
who prevail on non-fee claims, Congress 
wanted courts to award fees to prevailing 
plaintiffs without being forced to reach 
constitutional issues. Such avoidance of 
unnecessary constitutional question is a 
traditional principle that has long guided 
federal courts in constitutional 
litigation. 
To permit courts to award aes 
without reaching constitutional issues, 
Congress borrowed the test it had 
developed for the exercise of pendent 
jurisdiction. Under this test, courts may 
award fees to parties who prevail on 
nonconstitutional fee claim but only when 
the fee a~1 non- ae claims c.ise out of a 
common nu eus o_ operative fact. 
S. Steinglass, Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts 
§ 23.2(a) (1988) . 
plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory, non-civil-rights 
claim pendent to a substantial constitutional claim." id. at 
132. The Court explained that ,f[s]uch a fee award 'furthers 
the Congressional goal of encouraging suits to vindicate 
constitutional rights without undermining the longstanding 
judicial policy of avoiding unnecessary decision of important 
constitutional issues.'" III. at 135 (quoting Gaane v. Maher, 
594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
Again in Smith, the Court considered the award of attorney 
fees under section 1988 where the plaintiff had prevailed on a 
pendent statutory claim. Although the Court denied attorney 
fees, it did so on the narrow ground that Congress intended the 
statute involved, the Education of the Handicapped Act, "to be 
the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an 
equal protection claim to a publicly financed special 
education." 468 U.S. at 1009. The court concluded that since 
the E.H.A. did not provide for attorney fees, Congress did not 
intend fees be provided under section 1988 in the area of 
litigation over special education. I&. at 1013. The Court's 
conclusion was based on the expansive and pre-emptive nature of 
the Act. Jji. at 1010-11.6 The Court, however, acknowledged 
that a prevailing party should ordinarily be awarded attorney 
fees under section 1988 and that "Congress did not intend to 
have that authority extinguished by the fact that the case was 
settled or resolved on a nonconstitutional ground." III. at 1006. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals recently considered the precise 
issue before us in Lofft v. State Bd. of Higher Educ, 89 Or. 
App. 614, 750 P.2d 515 (1988). In Lofft, the plaintiff brought 
a state law tort and federal civil rights action claiming he 
was wrongfully terminated from his employment. The trial court 
awarded back pay under an employment contract theory, but 
6. Congress reacted to the decision in Smith "swiftly, 
decisively, and with uncharacteristic clarity to correct what 
it viewed as a judicial misinterpretation of its intent." 
Fontenot v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ, 805 
F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986). Congress amended the E.H.A. 
to include the awarding of attorney fees and made the amendment 
retroactive to the day before the Court announced its decision 
in Smith. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 
Pub.L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (codified in scattered 
sections at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400) (1982 & Supp. 1988). 
denied attorney fees apparently because the decision was based 
on the state law claim. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed 
on the attorney fees issue* The court determined that the 
plaintiff was .he prevailing party on his state law claim, id. 
at 517, that tne plaintiff had alleged a substantial fourteenth 
amendment due process claim, i_d. , that the state and federal 
constitutional claims were based on the same core of operative 
facts, ifiL , and that there were no special circumstances that 
made the awarding of attorney fees unjust in light of the 
policy of ordinarily awarding fees to prevailing plaintiffs 
under section 1983, ill. at 518. The court states: "if fee 
awards were available only when a court had passed favorably on 
a party's section 1983 claim, the Congressional policy of 
encouraging private enforcement of civil rights would 
contradict the judicial policy of avoiding decision on 
constitutional claims.- 1x1. at 517. 
As was the Lofft court, we are persuaded that plaintiff has 
asserted a substantial due process claim which, because of our 
narrow decision on state statutory grounds, we did not 
address. We further find her state statutory and 
constitutional claims arose out of a common nucleus of 
operative fact. Finally, we conclude there is no special 
circumstance which would mandate a denial of fees in this 
case. We therefore remand for the determination of a 
reasonable attorney fee. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
KJudith M. Billings, Judg^ 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T.Greenwood,Judge 
BENCH, Judge (Concurring and Dissenting): 
I concur fully with the conclusion that the District's 
policy is invalid under state law. I dissent, however, from the 
decision to award plaintiff her attorney fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981). I believe our original opinion, 
reported at 124 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Ct. App. 1989), correctly 
disposed of this case. I therefore voted to deny rehearing, and 
take this opportunity to explain why. 
As pointed out by the majority, attorney fees are 
recoverable in cases like this only when the winning state claim 
is -pendent to a substantial constitutional claim." Maher v. 
Gaane, 448 U.S. 122, 132 (1980). Unlike my colleagues, I do not 
believe plaintiff's state claim is pendent to a substantial 
claim under the federal constitution. 
Plaintiff alleged in this case that the imposition of 
student fees on those not receiving public assistance, but still 
unable to pay, infringed on her children's right to a free 
education. However, this is not a right, privilege, or immunity 
secured by the federal constitution. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 220-21 (1982) ("Public education is not a 'right' 
granted to individuals by the Constitution.") (citing San 
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriques, 411 U.S. 1, 34 
(1973)), reh'q denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982). The only reference 
in plaintiff's complaint to the federal constitution is in her 
second cause of action and in paragraph 2 of her prayer for 
relief. There, plaintiff alleged that her due process rights 
were violated by defendants' delay in conducting an appeal 
hearing on her request for fee waivers. I doubt that this 
pleading constitutes a viable claim under section 1983.1 It 
certainly is not a "substantial" claim under the federal 
constitution, especially in view of the fact that plaintiff had 
her appeal hearing four months after the District's decision 
awarding her a partial waiver.2 
1. Accord Call v. City of West Jordan, No. 880047, slip op. at 
5-6 (Utah Ct. App. March 5, 1990). To treat such a claim as 
viable will encourage the routine insertion of a generic, 
procedural due process claim in every suit where state action is 
alleged. Parties will thereby be able to circumvent the 
principle that attorney fees are not recoverable absent an 
explicit contractual or statutory provision. See Cobabe v. 
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. The main opinion's reliance on other possible due process 
arguments is misplaced since plaintiff did not include such 
allegations in her complaint. 
Furthermore, to receive her fees under section 1988, 
plaintiff's state claim must be "pendent" to a substantial 
federal claim. Plaintiff prevailed in this c ~e because the 
District's policy is more restrictive than tv Board's rules. 
That is a question of law that suggests noth g about the 
underlying procedure facts. As recently stated by the United 
States Supreme Cour 
Where the plaintiff's claims are based on 
different facts and legal theories, and the 
plaintiff has prevailed on only some of 
those claims, . . . f,[t]he congressional 
intent to limit [fee] awards to prevailing 
parties requires that these unrelated claims 
be treated as if they had been raised in 
separate lawsuits, and therefore no fees may 
be awarded for services on the unsuccessful 
claim." 
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland In p. School Dist., 109 
S. Ct. 1486 (1989) (quoting Henslev v. E_ .erhart, 461 U.S. 424, 
435 (1983)). See also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1015 
(1984) . 
Plaintiff %as failed to state a claim that will support an 
award of attor .y fees under section 1988. In the absence of 
another appliccole statute or agreement, plaintiff is not 
entitled to her attorney fees. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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